jcreed blog > Creative Annealing

Creative Annealing

Sometimes doing mathematics is like building an arch top-down. Look, I'm really sure this rock goes right here

[puts rock in mid-air, falls with a crash]

I just... there need to be other rocks elsewhere, I think. Maybe. But I'm really sure about the shape of this rock.

— jason reed (@jcreed) June 8, 2018
This is a feeling I've been having a lot lately. The kernel of it is something that is, I think, wholly unremarkable in almost every creative field, but it's something that I've had to learn and relearn in my guts several times. I'm going to try to state the thing I'm talking about, and it's going to sound very bland and obvious, but I'll say it anyway:
You probably have to make lots of wrong things before you're able to make the right thing.
An artist makes sketches. A writer makes rough drafts. A musician rehearses. An architect makes models (which, as such, are completely ineffective at achieving the goals of the actual building) Ok, sure, why is this interesting?

Is Mathematics Special

Because the notion of 'wrong' — or, maybe it's better to say, our expectations of the notion of wrongness — in art, and writing, and music, and architecture, and so on, are typically somewhat different than what wrongness entails in math. The 'wrongness' that gets remediated through refinement, practice, etc. is, more or less, a subjective wrongness, that is never absolutely present or absolutely eliminated. The 'wrongness' of a center-for-ants architectural model is a kind of wrongness-of-symbolic-representation that isn't even really a fault. A thing is made which says things about the real object's structure, but it needn't be (and its usefulness is predicated on not being) as fully developed as the real object.

But mathematics — good, old-fashioned formal mathematics with Axioms and Definitions and Proofs — has a very clear notion of wrongness, and on the face of it, it doesn't seem to have much use for wrong proofs.

And yet, here I am, with a pile of definitions and assertions of consequences that I've been tinkering with for the last month or so, and they're just wrong, and I know it. Some of the asserted consequences do not follow from the definitions. Really big, red-flag things, things that 100% need to be true for the system to be taken at all seriously as a proof theory, things like being able to implement identity functions, for crying out loud, just flat out don't work yet. And yet I don't feel very bothered about it!

I mean, don't get me wrong, I'm somewhat bothered. Some of the section titles in my LaTeX notes are things like Slight Sense of Panic. But it's not surprising; it's normal. This is what research looks like.The conclusion that I'm drawn to is that math actually isn't very special, and depends on drafts and naive models and broken-assed garbage as much as any other field.

Certainly I should mention physics, in which QFT is the shining example of how wrongness — by which I mean in this case "lack of secure mathematical foundations" — has provided apparently no impediment whatsoever to making just stupidly accurate predictions about the physical world. On the other hand, I still am a mathematician, and I find this state of affairs unsatisfying as an endpoint — but it does corroborate, I think, the notion that the human endeavor of doing mathematics can survive and make progress even for decades on the basis of merely some partially understood principles with some partial formal probes into their sensibleness.

How Can This Possibly Work

I think some things that make it possible to work on "wrong proofs" for so long without becoming discouraged (at least for me) are